What is dialectical inquiry

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  • Grew up in Zauckerode near Dresden. Studied philosophy, psychology and art history in Dresden, Paris and Florence. Re ... moreGrew up in Zauckerode near Dresden. Studied philosophy, psychology and art history in Dresden, Paris and Florence. Research stays at the Wittgenstein Archive of the University of Bergen, the Wren Library of Trinity College in Cambridge, the University of Chicago and Charles University in Prague. Currently researching the literary form of major philosophical works at the University of Zurich.edit
Wittgenstein as a student of Bertrand Russell and Friedrich Schiller as a student of Immanuel Kant hardly use any meta-theoretical structural terms for their theoretical writings. An exception in which both authors meet philosophically ... more
Wittgenstein as a student of Bertrand Russell and Friedrich Schiller as a student of Immanuel Kant hardly use any meta-theoretical structural terms for their theoretical writings. An exception in which both authors meet philosophically is the concept of game. The game takes on the task of showing a way out, from solidified-serious theories of philosophy to the fluid, living human practice. The game with which Wittgenstein and Schiller are serious stands for a philosophical structural concept that contains its own overcoming and abolition as a theoretical concept. In the following the story of the game is told, at the same time as an overcoming of the serious philosophical considerations of Russell and Kant and as a suspension of the history of the philosophical seriousness in the serious game by Wittgenstein and Schiller. "Because, to finally say it all at once, people only play where they are in the full meaning of the word human, and they are only fully human where they play." Friedrich Schiller 1795
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We can say with some certainty that Wittgenstein never read any of Hegel’s works, yet he was able to talk about Hegel and even at several points to describe the relation between his own philosophy and that of Hegel. In this chapter, I ... more
We can say with some certainty that Wittgenstein never read any of Hegel’s works, yet he was able to talk about Hegel and even at several points to describe the relation between his own philosophy and that of Hegel. In this chapter, I present two major moments in Wittgenstein’s philosophical career where he was explicitly taught about Hegel’s philosophy, and attempt to evaluate Wittgenstein’s statements about Hegel and what they show about the influence Wittgenstein’s knowledge of Hegel may have had on his own philosophy.
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For an investigation on the question "What did Wittgenstein know about Hegel's philosophy?", The difficulty of a relatively weak data situation combined with the desire to make as much historical sense as possible from this little became apparent
For an investigation on the question "What did Wittgenstein know about Hegel's philosophy?", The difficulty of a relatively weak data situation combined with the desire to generate as much historical meaning as possible from this little was revealed. Where are the methodological limits here? When Wittgenstein notes: “One should actually only write philosophy” (VB: 483), he certainly hears the German word “poetry” in addition to the aspect of the poetic as well as that of the creative. The question of desire and reality in Wittgenstein research is shown using the concrete example of Wittgenstein's trip to Russia and at the same time provides an insight into Wittgenstein's interest in Russian philosophy. This emphasizes polyphony and dialogicity in relation to the original mystical unity for which belief and knowledge can only be formally separated afterwards. Wittgenstein meets this claim by characterizing philosophy as a project of a synoptic overview and characterizing its activity as the urge for a clear presentation, which at the same time has to show its methodological limits.
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What is transcendence? The term is used in many sciences today. But are we talking about the same thing with the same term? Apparently not, or rather, not always. How can the term transcendence ... more
What is transcendence? The term is used in many sciences today. But are you talking about the same thing with the same term? Apparently not, or rather, not always. How can the term transcendence serve an interdisciplinary discourse that is often called for, when its respective purpose - as is sometimes clear - remains mostly obscure?
On the other hand: How or from where can the most generally applicable definition of transcendence be obtained? Or is it sufficient if every science defines “its” transcendence in a way that appears most useful to its respective research pragmatics? And what does this mean for the interdisciplinary discourse that is often requested and sometimes necessary? At least philosophy is seen as a discipline that is also able to reflect the research-guiding paradigms on which it is based. If that is true, it would be predestined to use a reflective analysis of terms to open up the respective internal, scientific-pragmatic use of terms for interdisciplinary discourse and thus make them practically accessible.
This work tries to make a contribution by reconstructing the understanding of transcendence of two of the most important German-speaking philosophers - G. W. F. Hegel and Martin Heidegger - in a descriptive-text-hermeneutic way. There are surprising parallels between the two presented concepts of transcendence - especially for a prior understanding that relies on the difference between the two authors. Parallels that make the hope appear justified that sooner or later, perhaps, a common and thus an interdisciplinary understanding of transcendence will be gained.
The author: Alexander Berg studied philosophy, art history and psychology in Dresden, Paris and Florence.
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According to a lexicon entry proposed by Wittgenstein himself, Wittgenstein regarded his preoccupation with the fundamentals of mathematics as what philosophical posterity needs to know about his thinking. In the ... more
According to a lexicon entry proposed by Wittgenstein himself, Wittgenstein regarded his preoccupation with the fundamentals of mathematics as what philosophical posterity needs to know about his thinking. In the lectures on the fundamentals of mathematics of 1939, Wittgenstein again examines what exactly he regards as the essence of this occupation. It turns out that Wittgenstein's aim is to emphasize the differences or differences in dealing with (mathematical) terms, which he contrasts in particular with a unity or identity of the terms.
The structure of the characterization of this contrast is strongly reminiscent of another thought by Wittgenstein, in which he later also characterizes his thinking about his efforts to differentiate - only in this case his philosophy of difference is differentiated from a philosophy of identity by G. W. F. Hegel.
The following investigation tries to clarify how Wittgenstein originally came to these considerations and, building on them, what they mean against the background of his own understanding of philosophy.
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In his memoirs, Theodore Redpath recalls a conversation with Ludwig Wittgenstein about the philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel. Wittgenstein tells Redpath that he had hardly read anything from Hegel, but after that little too ... more
In his memoirs, Theodore Redpath recalls a conversation with Ludwig Wittgenstein about the philosophy of G. W. F. Hegel. Wittgenstein tells Redpath that he had hardly read anything by Hegel, but judging by this little, he thinks that Hegel “had a good nose”. He is particularly impressed by Hegel's rejection of the 'proposition of contradiction' and Redpath connects Wittgenstein's remark with his interest in paradoxes.
In the lecture, the question will be discussed to what extent Hegel can speak of a "rejection of the so-called principle of contradiction" and how Hegel's understanding of contradiction is related to that of Wittgenstein. For this purpose, the story of the contradiction in Hegelian thinking is told about its essential stages, beginning with the habilitation thesis of 1801, where it advanced to the comprehensive structural concept of thinking as "contradictio est regula veri, non contradictio falsi" through its moment of certain negation, and ending with the science of logic around 1831, where the contradiction as an essentially logical reflection concept finds its place in the sphere of mediation from being (in the doctrine of being) to the being-in-itself of the concept (in the doctrine of concept).
This Hegelian history of contradiction is contrasted with a Wittgensteinian contradiction, which in its early episthemic stage in the treatise is still thought of as transcendental and is therefore interpreted by some authors as a "linguistic version of transcendental idealism" and finds its operative stage in the late period in which the contradiction is only determined by the concrete usage situation in each case in its provisional nature.
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From knowledge to thinking - Wittgenstein's dialectical method using the example of G. E. Moore's seminar notes In the work on Wittgenstein, attempts are regularly made to use the philosophical objects and arguments ... more
From knowledge to thinking - Wittgenstein's dialectical method using the example of G. E. Moore's seminar notes

In the work on Wittgenstein, attempts are regularly made to use the philosophical objects and arguments discussed by Wittgenstein to establish what his philosophy consists of. By examining the concrete circumstances of his thinking and their genesis in the institutions of the Cambridge Apostles, in the Moral Science Club and in personal conversations with Russell, Moore and others, it becomes clear how this philosophical content reached Wittgenstein's thinking.
Conversely, this opens up the possibility of trying to understand no longer the philosophical objects as content, but the special form that Wittgenstein gives these contents or in which he relates the philosophical objects to one another, as the genuine and peculiarity of his thinking.
With the help of G. E. Moore's seminar notes from the early 1930s, historical and systematic connections from the scholastic disputations going back to Aristotle to Wittgenstein's own discussion seminars are shown below; And it is further argued in favor of recognizing the dialectical form of these disputations in an equally dialectical form of Wittgenstein's thinking.
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When Ludwig Wittgenstein began studying in Cambridge in 1911, he had hardly any previous knowledge of philosophy. Everything he did in the comparatively short time up to the writing of his first own main philosophical work - the ... more
When Ludwig Wittgenstein began studying in Cambridge in 1911, he had hardly any previous knowledge of philosophy. Everything he learns in the comparatively short time up to the writing of his first own main philosophical work - the Tractatus - he essentially learns from Bertrand Russell in his lectures and the subsequent personal evening-length philosophical discussions. How was it possible that Wittgenstein was nevertheless able to develop such an independent way of thinking that was emancipated from Russell's philosophy - already in the Tractatus and even more so in his later work?
The answer to this question is reconstructed on the basis of the dispute about the concrete universal - a controversy hotly debated around Wittgenstein's arrival in Cambridge - and traced back to Hegel.
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