How to Teach Esl Perfectly Presently

ARISTOTLE PHYSICS - ΦΥΣΙΚΗΣ ΑΚΡΟΑΣΕΩΣ
Α. 1 (184a - 187a11)

1. Knowledge of natural things from their principles.
2. The refutation of Parmenides (and Melissus) doctrine of being

  
1. Since the knowledge and the cognition of all the objects which have their beginnings, causes and reasons rests on their exploration (for then we believe we know something when we have explored its first causes and its first beginnings, and up to on the basic building blocks), it is clear that in the case of natural science, too, an attempt must first be made to provide provisions about the beginnings. But our way goes from what is more understandable and clearer to us, towards what is naturally clearer and more understandable. Because not the same thing is understandable for us and in itself. It is therefore necessary to continue in this way from what is naturally more indistinct, but more clear to us, to what is naturally clearer and more understandable. Now it is clear to us first of all that is more complex; afterwards the beginnings and the basic building blocks become understandable from this by breaking it down. Therefore one has to move from the general to the particular. Because the whole thing is more understandable for the sense; but the general is a kind of whole, for this general contains a lot as parts. In the same case, to a certain extent, the words are also in relation to the concept. For they denote a whole in an indefinite way; e.g. the circle. Only the closer determination breaks it down into what is special. Even the children call all men father first, and mother the women; but later they begin to differentiate between the two.
(184a10) Ἐπειδὴ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι συμβαίνει περὶ πάσας τὰς μεθόδους, ὧν εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ ἢ αἴτια ἢ στοιχεῖα, ἐκ τοῦ ταῦτα γνωρίζειν (τότε γὰρ οἰόμεθα γιγνώσκειν ἕκαστον, ὅταν τὰ αἴτια γνωρίσωμεν τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς πρώτας καὶ μέχρι τῶν στοιχείων) , δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμης πειρατέον διορίσασθαι πρῶτον τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς. πέφυκε δὲ ἐκ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ἡμῖν ἡ ὁδὸς καὶ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα · οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ ἡμῖν τε γνώριμα καὶ ἁπλῶς. διόπερ ἀνάγκη τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον προάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφεστέρων μὲν τῇ φύσει ἡμῖν δὲ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα. ἔστι δ 'ἡμῖν τὸ πρῶτον δῆλα καὶ σαφῆ τὰ συγκεχυμένα μᾶλλον · ὕστερον δ' ἐκ τούτων γίγαδαται ἀγιτων γίγαδατατ σι νἱῖτμμ. διὸ ἐκ τῶν καθόλου ἐπὶ τὰ καθ 'ἕκαστα δεῖ προϊέναι · τὸ γὰρ ὅλον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν γνωριμώτερον, τὸ δὲ καθόλου ὅλον τί ἐστι · πολλὰ γὰρ περιλαμβάνει ὡς μέρη τὸ καθόλου. πέπονθε δὲ ταὐτὸ τοῦτο τρόπον τινὰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα πρὸς τὸν λόγον · (184b10) ὅλον γάρ τι καὶ ἀδιορίστως σημαίνει, οἷον ὁ κύκλος, ὁ δὲ ὁρισμὸς αὐτοῦ διαιρεῖ εἰς τὰ καθ 'ἕκαστα. καὶ τὰ παιδία τὸ μὲν πρῶτον προσαγορεύει πάντας τοὺς ἄνδρας πατέρας καὶ μητέρας τὰς γρδαὲω ντοτως τὰς γρδοναῖω ντοτως τἑς γρδοναῖω ντοτωστκίζεεγροναῖω ντοτω ὕτκεεετεω ντοτω ὕτκεεεαντἑτοτω ὕτσεαενττστύεω ντοτεω ὕτσεαετἑτύεαεντἑστεω ὕτστεω ὕτστεω ὕτστεω ὕτστεω ὕττεαα ττστεω ὕτστεω ντστεω
2. The beginning is either one or more. And when someone is either immobile, as Parmenides and Melissos say, or moves, like naturalists, some of whom call the air as the first beginning, others the water. But if there are more, either limited or unlimited. And if limited, but still more than one, either two, or three, or four, or some other number. This is the same investigation as when the question of how much of beings is asked. For here, too, one examines first of all what the being is made of, and according to this it is a question of whether it is one or many; limited or unlimited. So that the investigation is in fact concerned with the beginning and the reason, whether he is one or many.Ἀνάγκη δ 'ἤτοι μίαν εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ πλείους, καὶ εἰ μίαν, ἤτοι ἀκίνητον, ὥς φησι Παρμενίδης καὶ Μέλισσος, ἢ κινουμένην, ὥσπερ οἱ φυσικοί, οἱ μὲν ἀέρα φάσκοντες εἶναι οἱ δ' ὕδωρ τὴν πρώτην ἀρχήν · εἰ δὲ πλείους, ἢ πεπερασμένας ἢ ἀπείρους, καὶ εἰ πεπερασμένας πλείους δὲ μιᾶς, ἢ δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἢ τέτταρας ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ ἀριθμόν, καὶ εἰ ἀπείρους, ἢ οὕτως ὥσπερ Δημόκριτος, τὸ γένος ἕν, σχήματι δὲ <διαφερούσας>, ἢ εἴδει διαφερούσας ἢ καὶ ἐναντίας. ὁμοίως δὲ ζητοῦσι καὶ οἱ τὰ ὄντα ζητοῦντες πόσα · ἐξ ὧν γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ἐστὶ πρώτων, ζητοῦσι ταῦτα πότερον ἓν ἢ πολλά, καὶ εἰ πολλά, πεπερασμένα ἢ ἄπειρα, ὥστε τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ στοιχεῖον ζητοῦσι πότερον ἓν ἢ πολλά.

Analysis (diheresis - διαιροῦσι ταῦτα) to clarify the physical building blocks and principles

Research that is based on the unity and immobility of beings is not natural research. For just as the geometer no longer has anything to do with someone who denies the beginnings, but either belongs to another science, or to one that is common to all; so the one who deals with the beginnings themselves. For there is no more beginning if there is only one, and in this way there is one; because every beginning either begins something or is the first among several. So the consideration of the one in this form is like speaking about any proposition of those which are only put forward for the sake of the concept; like that Heraclitic; or as if one wanted to say: A person is what is; or solving a subtle task. These two doctrines, that of Melissus and that of Parmenides, really emphasize something like this: they begin from false presuppositions and do not continue in the actual final form. But especially Melisso's teaching is harsh and thoroughly one-sided. But, once a strange principle is admitted, the rest will follow by itself.τὸ μὲν οὖν εἰ ἓν καὶ ἀκίνητον τὸ ὂν σκοπεῖν οὐ περὶ φύσεώς ἐστι σκοπεῖν · (185a) ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τῷ γεωμέτρῃ οὐκέτι λόγος ἔστι πρὸς τὸν ἀνελόντα τὰς ἀρχάς, ἀλλ 'ἤτοι ἑτέρας ἐπιστήμης ἢ πασῶν κοινῆς, οὕτως οὐδὲ τῷ περὶ ἀρχῶν · οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἀρχὴ ἔστιν, εἰ ἓν μόνον καὶ οὕτως ἓν ἔστιν. ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ τινὸς ἢ τινῶν. ὅμοιον δὴ τὸ σκοπεῖν εἰ οὕτως ἓν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλην θέσιν ὁποιανοῦν διαλέγεσθαι τῶν λόγου ἕνεκα λεγομένων (οἷον τὴν Ἡρακλείτειον, ἢ εἴ τις φαίη ἄνθρωπον ἕνα τὸ ὂν εἶναι) ἢ λύειν λόγον ἐριστικόν, ὅπερ ἀμφότεροι μὲν ἔχουσιν οἱ λόγοι, καὶ ὁ Μελίσσου καὶ ὁ Παρμενίδου · καὶ γὰρ ψευδῆ λαμβάνουσι καὶ ἀσυλλόγιστοί εἰσιν · μᾶλλον δ 'ὁ Μελίσσου φορτικὸς καὶ οὐκ ἔχων ἀπορίαν, ἀλλ' ἑνὸς ἀτόπου δοθέντος τὰ ἄλλα συμβαίνει · τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν χαλεπόν.
We now assume that that which belongs to nature, either everything or some, is something that is in motion. This, however, follows from the gradual consideration of the subjects contained here. Incidentally, one does not need to encounter everything, but only the wrong conclusions that one draws from the beginning: E.g. the transformation of the circle into a square, that by means of the circle segments, has to be refuted by the geometer; that of the antiphon, on the other hand, does not concern the geometer.ἡμῖν δ 'ὑποκείσθω τὰ φύσει ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια κινούμενα εἶναι · δῆλον δ' ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. ἅμα δ 'οὐδὲ λύειν ἅπαντα προσήκει, ἀλλ' ἢ ὅσα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν τις ἐπιδεικνὺς ψεύδεται, ὅσα δὲ μή, οὔ, οἷον τὸν τετραγωνισμὸν τὸν μὲν διὰ τῶν τμημάτων γεωμετρικοῦ διαλῦσαι, τὸν δὲ Ἀντιφῶντος οὐ γεωμετρικοῦ ·
However, since the tasks of the former do not have nature as their object, but nevertheless have an influence on natural science, it is perhaps a good idea to discuss them a little; because the consideration has scientific content.οὐ μὴν ἀλλ 'ἐπειδὴ περὶ φύσεως μὲν οὔ, φυσικὰς δὲ ἀπορίας συμβαίνει λέγειν αὐτοῖς, ἴσως ἔχει καλῶς ἐπὶ μικρὸν διαλεχθῆναι περὶ αὐτῶν · ἔχει γὰρ φιλοσοφίαν ἡ σκέψις.
We begin most appropriately with the following. Since being means many things, the question arises how those who say that everything is one take it. Do you mean a being of this universe, or a size, or a quality? And further: if a being, is it an individual, like a person, or a horse, or a soul? or an individual texture in the same way, e.g. white, or warm, or something else like that? For all of this is very different, although it is equally inadmissible to state it. For if it is supposed to be essence as well as size and quality, regardless of whether it is separate from one another or not, we have a multiplicity of beings. But if everything is supposed to be quality or size, regardless of whether there is a being or not, this is strange; if nothing else can be called strange the impossible. For nothing exists apart from the rest, except the essence, since everything is presupposed to be something underlying it, namely the essence. - ἀρχὴ δὲ οἰκειοτάτη πασῶν, ἐπειδὴ πολλαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ὄν, πῶς λέγουσιν οἱ λέγοντες εἶναι ἓν τὰ πάντα, πότερον οὐσίαν τὰ πάντα ἢ ποσὰ ἢ ποιά, καὶ πάλιν πότερον οὐσίαν μίαν τὰ πάντα, οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἕνα ἢ ἵππον ἕνα ἢ ψυχὴν μίαν, ἢ ποιὸν ἓν δὲ τοῦτο, οἷον λευκὸν ἢ θερμὸν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν τοιούτων. ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα διαφέρει τε πολὺ καὶ ἀδύνατα λέγειν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἔσται καὶ οὐσία καὶ ποιὸν καὶ ποσόν, καὶ ταῦτα εἴτ 'ἀπολελυμένα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων εἴτε μή, πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα · εἰ δὲ πάντα ποιὸν ἢ ποσόν, εἴτ 'οὔσης οὐσίας εἴτε μὴ οὔσης, ἄτοπον, εἰ δεῖ ἄτοπον λέγειν τὸ ἀδύνατον. οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων χωριστόν ἐστι παρὰ τὴν οὐσίαν · πάντα γὰρ καθ 'ὑποκειμένου λέγεται τῆς οὐσίαν.
But Melissos calls beings unlimited. In this way being would be a quantity. Because the unlimited is in size. But that a being is unlimited, or a quality, or a suffering, is not permissible, except incidentally, if they were about at the same time greats. Because the concept of the unlimited presupposes the size, but not the essence or the quality. But if being is both essence and magnitude, then it is two and not one. But if it is only essence, it is not unlimited, nor does it have any size; because otherwise it would be a size. -Μέλισσος δὲ τὸ ὂν ἄπειρον εἶναί φησιν. ποσὸν ἄρα τι τὸ ὄν · τὸ γὰρ ἄπειρον ἐν τῷ ποσῷ, οὐσίαν δὲ ἄπειρον εἶναι ἢ ποιότητα ἢ πάθος (185b) οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, εἰ ἅμα καὶ ποσὰ ἄττα εἶεν · ὁ γὰρ τοῦ ἀπείρου λόγος τῷ ποσῷ προσχρῆται, ἀλλ 'οὐκ οὐσίᾳ οὐδὲ τῷ ποιῷ. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν καὶ οὐσία ἔστι καὶ ποσόν, δύο καὶ οὐχ ἓν τὸ ὄν · εἰ δ 'οὐσία μόνον, οὐκ ἄπειρον, οὐδὲ μέγεθος ἕξει οὐδέν · ποσὸν γάρ τι ἔσται.
But since the word one also means many things, like the word being, it can also be seen in this respect how they mean that the one is the whole. But one calls one either the continuously connected, or the indivisible, or that whose concept, which contains its what, is one and the same: like wine and grape juice. If it is now that which is continuously connected, then that which is is much; for the continuous is divisible into infinity. It also gives rise to disputes about the concepts of part and whole, which perhaps do not concern that doctrine, but are in and of themselves such: whether one or more the part and the whole, and if one, like one; if more, how more. So
also with regard to the parts that are not continuously connected, which, when each is inseparably one with the whole, are also among themselves. - On the other hand, is it the indivisible; now it can be neither size nor quality, nor unlimited, as Melissos says, nor limited, like Parmenides. Because the limit is indivisible, not the limited.
ἔτι ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν πολλαχῶς λέγεται ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄν, σκεπτέον τίνα τρόπον λέγουσιν εἶναι ἓᾶν τν ενναι ᾶᾶν πντ. λέγεται δ 'ἓν ἢ τὸ συνεχὲς ἢ τὸ ἀδιαίρετον ἢ ὧν ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ εἷς ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶθναι, ὥσἶπερας. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν συνεχές, πολλὰ τὸ ἕν · εἰς ἄπειρον γὰρ διαιρετὸν τὸ συνεχές. (Ἔχει δ 'ἀπορίαν περὶ τοῦ μέρους καὶ τοῦ ὅλου, ἴσως δὲ οὐ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀλλ' αὐτὴν καθ 'αὑτήν, πότερον ἓν ἢ πλείω τὸ μέρος καὶ τὸ ὅλον, καὶ πῶς ἓν ἢ πλείω, καὶ εἰ πλείω, πῶς πλείω, καὶ περὶ τῶν μερῶν τῶν μὴ συνεχῶν · καὶ εἰ τῷ ὅλῳ ἓν ἑκάτερον ὡς ἀδιαίρετον, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς.) ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ὡς ἀδιαίρετον, οὐθὲν ἔσται ποσὸν οὐδὲ ποιόν, οὐδὲ δὴ ἄπειρον τὸ ὄν, ὥσπερ Μέλισσός φησιν, οὐδὲ πεπερασμένον, ὥσπερ Παρμενίδης · τὸ γὰρ πέρας ἀδιαίρετον, οὐ τὸ πεπερασμένον.
If, according to the concept of being one, beings, such as dress and skirt, are finally to be one, then one falls into that assertion of Heraclitus. For then it would be the same for the good and for the bad, the being-good and the being-good. So that good and not good themselves become the same, and man and horse. It is then no longer a question of being that is one, but that it is nothing; and being in nature and being in size coincide.
This questionable concern also fell on those who came later, as it did in the past, that they might want to make the same thing into one and into many at the same time. That is why some began to leave out the "is", like Lycophron. Others used the expression differently and did not ask: Man is white, but that he has taken on white color; still, it is in progress, but rather, it is going: so that it does not want to begin with the "is" and make the one into much, as if something connected to designate the one and the being. But there is much that is, either according to the concept. So it is different to be white and musical, but both belong to the same thing; so we have the one as a multitude. Or by separation, like the whole and the parts. Here now they stopped short and allowed that the one be many. As if it were not possible for the same to be one and many, but not the opposite. Because it is one thing, partly as a possibility, partly as reality.
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τῷ λόγῳ ἓν τὰ ὄντα πάντα ὡς λώπιον καὶ ἱμάτιον, τὸν Ἡρακλείτου λόγον συμβαίνει λέγειν αὐτοῖς · ταὐτὸν γὰρ ἔσται ἀγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ εἶναι, καὶ ἀγαθῷ καὶ μὴ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι - ὥστε ταὐτὸν ἔσται ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἵππος, καὶ οὐ περὶ τοῦ ἓν εἶναι τὰ ὄντα ὁ λόγος ἔσται ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ μηδέν - καὶ τὸ τοιῳδὶ εἶναι καὶ τοσῳδὶ τ. ἐθορυβοῦντο δὲ καὶ οἱ ὕστεροι τῶν ἀρχαίων ὅπως μὴ ἅμα γένηται αὐτοῖς τὸ αὐτὸ ἓν καὶ πολλά. διὸ οἱ μὲν τὸ ἐστὶν ἀφεῖλον, ὥσπερ Λυκόφρων, οἱ δὲ τὴν λέξιν μετερρύθμιζον, ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐ λευκός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ λελεύκωται, οὐδὲ βαδίζων ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ βαδίζει, ἵνα μή ποτε τὸ ἐστὶ προσάπτοντες πολλὰ εἶναι ποιῶσι τὸ ἕν, ὡς μοναχῶς λεγομένου τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ τοῦ ὄντος. πολλὰ δὲ τὰ ὄντα ἢ λόγῳ (οἷον ἄλλο τὸ λευκῷ εἶναι καὶ μουσικῷ, τὸ δ 'αὐτὸ ἄμφω · πολλὰ ἄδλι ὰετα στκ ὶιν. ἐνταῦθα (186a) δὲ ἤδη ἠπόρουν, καὶ ὡμολόγουν τὸ ἓν πολλὰ εἶναι - ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐνδεχόμενον ταὐτὸν ἕν τε καὶ πολλὰ εἶναι, μὴ τἀντικείμενα δέ · ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἓν καὶ δυνάμει καὶ ἐντελεχείᾳ.
3. If one attacks it in this way, it seems impossible that being is one. To face their evidence is not difficult either; for both, Melissus and Parmenides, make use of precarious conclusions. [But Melisso's teaching is particularly harsh and thoroughly one-sided. Yes, once a strange principle is admitted, the rest of the process follows automatically.] It is clear that Melissos is now wrong. Because he believes he can assume that if everything that is becoming has a beginning, that which is not becoming has none. Then it is also striking to assume a beginning of the thing in the thing itself, and not merely of the thing in general in time. And this not only with becoming in and of itself, but also with that which is at the same time transformation; as if there was no continuous transition. Next, why should it just be immobile when it is one? Because just as the part that one is, e.g. this particular water, moves within itself: why not the whole? And then why should there not be a reshuffle of this whole as such? - Finally, according to the form determination, it cannot be completely one at all, one would have to understand by that what it is made of. In such a way some of the naturalists also assumed unity; but not that way. Because the human being is different from the horse according to the determination of form, and everything is opposite to one another.Τόν τε δὴ τρόπον τοῦτον ἐπιοῦσιν ἀδύνατον φαίνεται τὰ ὄντα ἓν εἶναι, καὶ ἐξ ὧν ἐπλὐεικνύουσι, πλὐειννουσι, πλὐειννουσι, πλὐεχανονιννονεννοενανοεννενοενεν ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἐριστικῶς συλλογίζονται, καὶ Μέλισσος καὶ Παρμενίδης [καὶ γὰρ ψευδῆ λαμβάνουσι καὶ ἀσυλλόγιστοί εἰσιν αὐτῶν οἱ λόγοι · μᾶλλον δ 'ὁ Μελίσσου φορτικὸς καὶ οὐκ ἔχων ἀπορίαν, ἀλλ' ἑνὸς ἀτόπου δοθέντος τἆλλα συμβαίνει · τοῦτο δ 'οὐθὲν χαλεπόν]. ὅτι μὲν οὖν παραλογίζεται Μέλισσος, δῆλον οἴεται γὰρ εἰληφέναι, εἰ τὸ γενόμενον ἔχει ἀρχὴν ἅπὸόν, ὅρχὴν πὸόν, ὅντεντιαν, ὅνταντον ἔχει ἀρχὴν ἅπὸόν, ὅντεντεομ ἅει ἀρχὴν ἅπὸόν, ὅντεντεομ ἔχεγ ἔχρὸν ὐπὸόν, ὅνταντεομ εγ. εἶτα καὶ τοῦτο ἄτοπον, τὸ παντὸς εἶναι ἀρχήν τοῦ πράγματος καὶ μὴ τοῦ χρόνου, καὶ γενέσεως μὴ τῆς ἁπλῆς ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἀθρόας γιγνομένης μεταβολῆς. ἔπειτα διὰ τί ἀκίνητον, εἰ ἕν; ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὸ μέρος ἓν ὄν, τοδὶ τὸ ὕδωρ, κινεῖται ἐν ἑαυτῷ, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ τὸ πᾶν; ἔπειτα ἀλλοίωσις διὰ τί οὐκ ἂν εἴη; ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ εἴδει οἷόν τε ἓν εἶναι, πλὴν τῷ ἐξ οὗ (οὕτως δὲ ἓν καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν τινες λέγουσιν, ἐκείνως δ 'οὔ) · ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἵππου ἕτερον τῷ εἴδει καὶ τἀναντία ἀλλήλων.
As for Parmenides, he has the same expression of that doctrine, and perhaps still others peculiar to him. The rebuttal is partly because it is wrong and partly because it lacks proper consequence. It is false in that it presupposes that being has a simple meaning, since it has a multiple meaning. Not consistent, because if you only wanted to put the white so that the white denoted a unit, none the less the white becomes a lot, and not one. Namely, the white thing would neither be one through continuous connection, nor would it be in the concept. For the being of white color and of the thing that assumes color would be another. Therefore, something special does not need to be accepted outside of the white, for it does not become the other to the extent that it is separate, but being in itself is something different for the color and for the thing that it takes on. But Parmenides did not see this. It must therefore presuppose that those who say that one is being, not only that one means being, of which it is also predicted; but also insofar as it is as well as insofar as it is one. Because something is considered to be attached or incidental only to the extent that something is fundamental to it. There can be no such thing as being to which being should be attached. Because it would be something other than being; so it would be a non-existent. It follows from this that there is nothing that exists but that which is as such. For in its being there would no longer have any being if there was not much to denote that which is; in such a way that a being of the individual is posited. But it was agreed that being should mean one. If now beings as such are not attached to anyone, but everything to that; what difference then remains, whether the being as such signifies the being or a non-being? For if being as such can also be white at the same time, but being white is not being as such, then being cannot even be ascribed to it, because what is is only being as such; and the whites consequently become nonexistent. Not that it is not this particular, but that it is not a being at all. So what is as such becomes what is not. Because it can rightly be said of beings as such that they are white. But this denoted that which did not exist. If, accordingly, the white could also mean the being as such, then the being would mean a majority. Beings will also have no greatness if only beings as such are being-being. For each of the parts would have a different being.καὶ πρὸς Παρμενίδην δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος τῶν λόγων, καὶ εἴ τινες ἄλλοι εἰσὶν ἴδιοι · καὶ ἡ λύσις τῇ μὲν ὅτι ψευδὴς τῇ δὲ ὅτι οὐ συμπεραίνεται, ψευδὴς μὲν ᾗ ἁπλῶς λαμβάνει τὸ ὂν λέγεσθαι, λεγομένου πολλαχῶς, ἀσυμπέραντος δὲ ὅτι, εἰ μόνα τὰ λευκὰ ληφθείη, σημαίνοντος ἓν τοῦ λευκοῦ, οὐθὲν ἧττον πολλὰ τὰ λευκὰ καὶ οὐχ ἕν · οὔτε γὰρ τῇ συνεχείᾳ ἓν ἔσται τὸ λευκὸν οὔτε τῷ λόγῳ. ἄλλο γὰρ ἔσται τὸ εἶναι λευκῷ καὶ τῷ δεδεγμένῳ. καὶ οὐκ ἔσται παρὰ τὸ λευκὸν οὐθὲν χωριστόν · οὐ γὰρ ᾗ χωριστὸν ἀλλὰ τῷ εἶναι ἕτερον τὸ λευκᾧν ιρν τὸ λευκὸν ιρν χρτν ωριστόν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο Παρμενίδης οὔπω συνεώρα. ἀνάγκη δὴ λαβεῖν μὴ μόνον ἓν σημαίνειν τὸ ὄν, καθ 'οὗ ἂν κατηγορηθῇ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπερ ὂν καὶ ὅπερ ἕν. τὸ γὰρ συμβεβηκὸς καθ 'ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται, ὥστε ᾧ συμβέβηκε τὸ ὄν, οὐκ ἔσταἄς (ἕτερο ν) στὐρα (ἕτεροὄb) στὐρα (ἕτερο ν) στὐρα (ἕτεροὄ ν) στὰρα (ἕτερὄ ν) σταρα (ἕτερὄὄ ν) στὐρα (ἕτεροὄ ν) στὐρα (ἕτεροὄ ν). οὐ δὴ ἔσται ἄλλῳ ὑπάρχον τὸ ὅπερ ὄν. οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ὄν τι αὐτὸ εἶναι, εἰ μὴ πολλὰ τὸ ὂν σημαίνει οὕτως ὥστε εἶναί τι ἕκαστον. ἀλλ 'ὑπόκειται τὸ ὂν σημαίνειν ἕν. εἰ οὖν τὸ ὅπερ ὂν μηδενὶ συμβέβηκεν ἀλλὰ <τὰ ἄλλα> ἐκείνῳ, τί μᾶλλον τὸ ὅπερ ὂν σημαίνει τὸ ὂν ἢ μὴ ὄν; εἰ γὰρ ἔσται τὸ ὅπερ ὂν [ταὐτὸ] καὶ λευκόν, τὸ λευκῷ δ 'εἶναι μὴ ἔστιν ὅπερ ὄν (οὐδὲ γὰρ συμβεβηκέναι αὐτῷ οἷόν τε τὸ ὄν · οὐδὲν γὰρ ὂν ὃ οὐχ ὅπερ ὄν) οὐκ ἄρα ὂν τὸ λευκόν · οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὥσπερ τι μὴ ὄν, ἀλλ 'ὅλως μὴ ὄν. τὸ ἄρα ὅπερ ὂν οὐκ ὄν ἀληθὲς γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὅτι λευκόν, τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ὂν ἐσήμαινεν. ὥστε καὶ τὸ λευκὸν σημαίνει ὅπερ ὄν πλείω ἄρα σημαίνει τὸ ὄν. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ μέγεθος ἕξει τὸ ὄν, εἴπερ ὅπερ ὂν τὸ ὄν ἑκατέρῳ γὰρ ἕτερον τὸ εἶναι τῶν μορίων.
But that being as such breaks down into other being as such, also results from the concept. E.g. if man is a being as such, then the animal must also be a being as such, and the bipedal. Because if they are not beings as such, then they are adherents, and either man or something else is their basis. But this is impossible. For attached means that which either can exist as well as not exist, or in the concept of which that to which it is attached is present; E.g. sitting, so separately said. The concept of the leg is also in the lame
currently. In this regard, something like lameness is called a disaster.
ὅτι δὲ διαιρεῖται τὸ ὅπερ ὂν εἰς ὅπερ ὄν τι ἄλλο, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ φανερόν, οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰ ἔστιν ὅπερ ὄν τι, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ζῷον ὅπερ ὄν τι εἶναι καὶ τὸ δίπουν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ὅπερ ὄν τι, συμβεβηκότα ἔσται. ἢ οὖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ ὑποκειμένῳ. ἀλλ 'ἀδύνατον · συμβεβηκός τε γὰρ λέγεται τοῦτο, ἢ ὃ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ἢ οὗ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὑπάρχει τὸ ᾧ συμβέβηκεν [ἢ ἐν ᾧ ὁ λόγος ὑπάρχει ᾧ συμβέβηκεν] (οἷον τὸ μὲν καθῆσθαι ὡς χωριζόμενον, ἐν δὲ τῷ σιμῷ ὑπάρχει ὁ λόγος ὁ τῆς ῥινὸς ᾗ φαμὲν συμβεβηκέναι τὸ σιμόν) ·
But what is contained in the concept and the determination of the whole, or what this is made of, in its concept the concept of the whole is not present; E.g. in the two-footed man, or in the white man, that of the white man. If this behaves in this way, and yet the bipedal should cling to man, it must be able to be separated from him; so that it is a question of man not being bipedal: or in the concept of bipedal the concept of man would be contained. But this is impossible; the that is contained in the concept of this. But the two-footed and the beast should cling to another, and each of the two is not a being as such; so the human being would also belong to the things that are attached to another. So it remains that what a being has as such does not depend on anybody, and that rather both and what consists of them are to be named as the basis. The whole consists of the indivisible.ἔτι ὅσα ἐν τῷ ὁριστικῷ λόγῳ ἔνεστιν ἢ ἐξ ὧν ἐστιν, ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ τούτων οὐκ ἐνυπάρχει ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ ὅλου, οἷον ἐν τῷ δίποδι ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἐν τῷ λευκῷ ὁ τοῦ λευκοῦ ἀνθρώπου. εἰ τοίνυν ταῦτα τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ συμβέβηκε τὸ δίπουν, ἀνάγκη χωριστὸν εἶναι αὐτό, ὥστε ἐνδέχοιτο ἂν μὴ δίπουν εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἢ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ τοῦ δίποδος ἐνέσται ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγος. ἀλλ 'ἀδύνατον ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἐκείνου λόγῳ ἔνεστιν. εἰ δ 'ἄλλῳ συμβέβηκε τὸ δίπουν καὶ τὸ ζῷον, καὶ μὴ ἔστιν ἑκάτερον ὅπερ ὄν τι, καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἂβτῳβτητω τω εβητω ἂβτῶβτητωτω ββτῳβτητω ητω ἂητω σητω ἂητω σητω ἂητω ἂητω σητω σητω βητω στω σητω βητω στω ἂητω ἂητω βητω ἂητω στω ἂητω ἂητω στω ἂβτ εἴητω ἂβτ εἴητω ἂβτν καὶ τὸ ζῷουν καὶ τὸ ζῷον ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅπερ ὂν ἔστω μηδενὶ συμβεβηκός, καὶ καθ 'οὗ ἄμφω [καὶ ἑκατέρον], καὶ τὸ ἐρκ ταύτων λὸε ρέθω ντὸετᾶθω · ρἄτω ντε ωρστω ντε έρτθω
But some gave in to both doctrines: that everything is one, if being means one, with the addition that that is also nonexistent. The other, however, in such a way that they split the division into two sizes that are indivisible. Incidentally, it is evident that it is not true that if one means what is and cannot be contradiction at the same time, then there is therefore no non-being. Because nothing prevents that that which does not exist is indeed not as general, but nevertheless as a certain non-existent. But to say that if there is nothing else outside of beings themselves, everything must become one, is strange. For who understands something other than the being of a particular being as such? But if this is so, then nothing prevents from this side from the fact that much is the being; As already said. It is clear that such a unity of beings is inadmissible.(187a) ἔνιοι δ 'ἐνέδοσαν τοῖς λόγοις ἀμφοτέροις, τῷ μὲν ὅτι πάντα ἕν, εἰ τὸ ὂν ἓν σημαίνει, ὅτι ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν, τῷ δὲ ἐκ τῆς διχοτομίας, ἄτομα ποιήσαντες μεγέθη. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθὲς ὡς, εἰ ἓν σημαίνει τὸ ὂν καὶ μὴ οἷόν τε ἅμα τὴν ἀντίφασιν, οὐκ ἔσται οὐθὲν μὴ ὄν · οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει, μὴ ἁπλῶς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὄν τι εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν. τὸ δὲ δὴ φάναι, παρ 'αὐτὸ τὸ ὂν εἰ μή τι ἔσται ἄλλο, ἓν πάντα ἔσεσθαι, ἄτοπον. τίς γὰρ μανθάνει αὐτὸ τὸ ὂν εἰ μὴ τὸ ὅπερ ὄν τι εἶναι; εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲν ὅμως κωλύει πολλὰ εἶναι τὰ ὄντα, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἓν εἶναι τὸ ὂν ἀδύνατον, δῆλον.
Transl .: after C.H.Weisse (1829) 
(184a10) Ἐπειδὴ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι συμβαίνει περὶ πάσας τὰς μεθόδους, ὧν εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ ἢ αἴτια ἢ στοιχεῖα, ἐκ τοῦ ταῦτα γνωρίζειν (τότε γὰρ οἰόμεθα γιγνώσκειν ἕκαστον, ὅταν τὰ αἴτια γνωρίσωμεν τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς πρώτας καὶ μέχρι τῶν στοιχείων) , δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμης πειρατέον διορίσασθαι πρῶτον τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς. πέφυκε δὲ ἐκ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ἡμῖν ἡ ὁδὸς καὶ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα · οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ ἡμῖν τε γνώριμα καὶ ἁπλῶς. διόπερ ἀνάγκη τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον προάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφεστέρων μὲν τῇ φύσει ἡμῖν δὲ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα. ἔστι δ 'ἡμῖν τὸ πρῶτον δῆλα καὶ σαφῆ τὰ συγκεχυμένα μᾶλλον · ὕστερον δ' ἐκ τούτων γίγαδαται ἀγιτων γίγαδατατ σι νἱῖτμμ.διὸ ἐκ τῶν καθόλου ἐπὶ τὰ καθ 'ἕκαστα δεῖ προϊέναι · τὸ γὰρ ὅλον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν γνωριμώτερον, τὸ δὲ καθόλου ὅλον τί ἐστι · πολλὰ γὰρ περιλαμβάνει ὡς μέρη τὸ καθόλου. πέπονθε δὲ ταὐτὸ τοῦτο τρόπον τινὰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα πρὸς τὸν λόγον · (184b10) ὅλον γάρ τι καὶ ἀδιορίστως σημαίνει, οἷον ὁ κύκλος, ὁ δὲ ὁρισμὸς αὐτοῦ διαιρεῖ εἰς τὰ καθ 'ἕκαστα. καὶ τὰ παιδία τὸ μὲν πρῶτον προσαγορεύει πάντας τοὺς ἄνδρας πατέρας καὶ μητέρας τὰς γρδαὲω ντοτως τὰς γρδοναῖω ντοτως τἑς γρδοναῖω ντοτωστκίζεεγροναῖω ντοτω ὕτκεεετεω ντοτω ὕτκεεεαντἑτοτω ὕτσεαενττστύεω ντοτεω ὕτσεαετἑτύεαεντἑστεω ὕτστεω ὕτστεω ὕτστεω ὕτστεω ὕττεαα ττστεω ὕτστεω ντστεω
(184a10) 1. In the total area of ​​the investigations under principles, reasons and ultimate moments, knowledge and understanding result from the knowledge of these very foundations - because then, if we understand the ultimate reasons of the individual and his ultimate principles and if we understand it down to his last moments have grasped into it, we consider it recognized -. And so, with reference to natural science, too, the need to begin with an attempt to determine its principles is evident. But now it is the natural fate of our knowledge that it has to start from what is clearer and clearer for us, and to move on to what would be clearer and clearer in itself. For us, insight by no means coincides with insight in general. So it remains with the need to proceed (here as well) in such a way that we start from what is less clear about himself, but is more clear to us, and move on to what about himself is clearer and more insightful represents. Now this, which is clear and distinct for us at the beginning, is in truth just an undivided manifold, and only the subsequent analysis do the last moments and principles become tangible. For this reason, thinking has to move on from the general to the particular. For it is the respective whole that is preferably presented to sensual perception, and the general is a kind of whole; for it encloses a manifold which, as it were, forms its parts. In a certain way (184b10) we have the same state of affairs in the relation between word and concept; the word, for example "circle", means a kind of whole, and indeed in a rather indefinite way, while the definition of the same represents a distinction into the multiplicity of the individual. In the beginning the children say "father" to all men and "mother" to all women and only then are they able to grasp both parents in their individuality.
Ἀνάγκη δ 'ἤτοι μίαν εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ πλείους, καὶ εἰ μίαν, ἤτοι ἀκίνητον, ὥς φησι Παρμενίδης καὶ Μέλισσος, ἢ κινουμένην, ὥσπερ οἱ φυσικοί, οἱ μὲν ἀέρα φάσκοντες εἶναι οἱ δ' ὕδωρ τὴν πρώτην ἀρχήν · εἰ δὲ πλείους, ἢ πεπερασμένας ἢ ἀπείρους, καὶ εἰ πεπερασμένας πλείους δὲ μιᾶς, ἢ δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἢ τέτταρας ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ ἀριθμόν, καὶ εἰ ἀπείρους, ἢ οὕτως ὥσπερ Δημόκριτος, τὸ γένος ἕν, σχήματι δὲ <διαφερούσας>, ἢ εἴδει διαφερούσας ἢ καὶ ἐναντίας. ὁμοίως δὲ ζητοῦσι καὶ οἱ τὰ ὄντα ζητοῦντες πόσα · ἐξ ὧν γὰρ τὰ ὄντα ἐστὶ πρώτων, ζητοῦσι ταῦτα πότερον ἓν ἢ πολλά, καὶ εἰ πολλά, πεπερασμένα ἢ ἄπειρα, ὥστε τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ τὸ στοιχεῖον ζητοῦσι πότερον ἓν ἢ πολλά.2. If, moreover, other thinkers investigate the question of how many beings there are, this investigation amounts to the same thing; for they too are concerned with the question of whether that from which things ultimately originate is a single or manifold, and, if it is a manifold, whether it is a determinate or an indeterminate manifold; they, too, ask whether the ground and the last moment are single or manifold.

Analysis (diheresis - διαιροῦσι ταῦτα) to clarify the physical building blocks and principles

τὸ μὲν οὖν εἰ ἓν καὶ ἀκίνητον τὸ ὂν σκοπεῖν οὐ περὶ φύσεώς ἐστι σκοπεῖν · (185a) ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τῷ γεωμέτρῃ οὐκέτι λόγος ἔστι πρὸς τὸν ἀνελόντα τὰς ἀρχάς, ἀλλ 'ἤτοι ἑτέρας ἐπιστήμης ἢ πασῶν κοινῆς, οὕτως οὐδὲ τῷ περὶ ἀρχῶν · οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἀρχὴ ἔστιν, εἰ ἓν μόνον καὶ οὕτως ἓν ἔστιν. ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ τινὸς ἢ τινῶν. ὅμοιον δὴ τὸ σκοπεῖν εἰ οὕτως ἓν καὶ πρὸς ἄλλην θέσιν ὁποιανοῦν διαλέγεσθαι τῶν λόγου ἕνεκα λεγομένων (οἷον τὴν Ἡρακλείτειον, ἢ εἴ τις φαίη ἄνθρωπον ἕνα τὸ ὂν εἶναι) ἢ λύειν λόγον ἐριστικόν, ὅπερ ἀμφότεροι μὲν ἔχουσιν οἱ λόγοι, καὶ ὁ Μελίσσου καὶ ὁ Παρμενίδου · καὶ γὰρ ψευδῆ λαμβάνουσι καὶ ἀσυλλόγιστοί εἰσιν · μᾶλλον δ 'ὁ Μελίσσου φορτικὸς καὶ οὐκ ἔχων ἀπορίαν, ἀλλ' ἑνὸς ἀτόπου δοθέντος τὰ ἄλλα συμβαίνει · τοῦτο δὲ οὐδὲν χαλεπόν.As for the question of the possible uniqueness and lack of process of beings, it is not at all a question which could affect nature. (185a) Because it is exactly the same as the geometry of a partner who does not allow the principles (of geometry) to apply, no longer has the opportunity to argue, and any further conversation would have to be the subject of another science or even a general science here also the researcher of principles at the end (as soon as one wanted to assume that being is a single and process-free. Because there is no longer any principle if there is only one and the being is in this Way is one. After all, a principle is always a principle for something, whether the latter is a single one or a manifold. An investigation into whether beings are one in this way is just as (meaningless) as dealing with any thesis that is mere talk - e.g. with the Herakleitos thesis or with such a sentence: Being is a single human being also like an attempt to resolve an eristic sentence. The two positions really have such an eristic character in themselves, both that of Melissus and that of Parmenides. What is wrong is what they set as premises, and they violate the inference logic; The position of Melissos is particularly clumsy, it does not present any real difficulty, rather the wrong approach results in further developments by itself; it doesn't need any art. -
ἡμῖν δ 'ὑποκείσθω τὰ φύσει ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια κινούμενα εἶναι · δῆλον δ' ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. ἅμα δ 'οὐδὲ λύειν ἅπαντα προσήκει, ἀλλ' ἢ ὅσα ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν τις ἐπιδεικνὺς ψεύδεται, ὅσα δὲ μή, οὔ, οἷον τὸν τετραγωνισμὸν τὸν μὲν διὰ τῶν τμημάτων γεωμετρικοῦ διαλῦσαι, τὸν δὲ Ἀντιφῶντος οὐ γεωμετρικοῦ ·For us, on the other hand, this is the basic principle: The natural structures are processual, either all of them, or at least some of them; methodical experience proves it. It is also not necessary to refute every arbitrary thesis, but only those positions that are false, but for which their representatives tried to prove based on the principles, even if they failed. So it makes sense for a geometer to refute the evidence for the quadrature of the circle that is given by means of the segments, whereas Antiphon's proof is not a possible object for a geometrical refutation.
οὐ μὴν ἀλλ 'ἐπειδὴ περὶ φύσεως μὲν οὔ, φυσικὰς δὲ ἀπορίας συμβαίνει λέγειν αὐτοῖς, ἴσως ἔχει καλῶς ἐπὶ μικρὸν διαλεχθῆναι περὶ αὐτῶν · ἔχει γὰρ φιλοσοφίαν ἡ σκέψις.But it may nevertheless be appropriate to briefly deal with them (Parmenides and Melissos); for even if their theses cannot concern nature, they do concern certain natural problems. It is not without a philosophical interest to examine them.
ἀρχὴ δὲ οἰκειοτάτη πασῶν, ἐπειδὴ πολλαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ὄν, πῶς λέγουσιν οἱ λέγοντες εἶναι ἓν τὰ πάντα, πότερον οὐσίαν τὰ πάντα ἢ ποσὰ ἢ ποιά, καὶ πάλιν πότερον οὐσίαν μίαν τὰ πάντα, οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἕνα ἢ ἵππον ἕνα ἢ ψυχὴν μίαν, ἢ ποιὸν ἓν δὲ τοῦτο, οἷον λευκὸν ἢ θερμὸν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν τοιούτων. ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα διαφέρει τε πολὺ καὶ ἀδύνατα λέγειν. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἔσται καὶ οὐσία καὶ ποιὸν καὶ ποσόν, καὶ ταῦτα εἴτ 'ἀπολελυμένα ἀπ' ἀλλήλων εἴτε μή, πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα · εἰ δὲ πάντα ποιὸν ἢ ποσόν, εἴτ 'οὔσης οὐσίας εἴτε μὴ οὔσης, ἄτοπον, εἰ δεῖ ἄτοπον λέγειν τὸ ἀδύνατον. οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων χωριστόν ἐστι παρὰ τὴν οὐσίαν · πάντα γὰρ καθ 'ὑποκειμένου λέγεται τῆς οὐσίαν.Since the term "being" is ambiguous, it is best to start from the question of what meaning it has in the sentence, the whole of being be one thing is used: whether the whole of being is thought of as substance or else as quantity or as quality, furthermore, whether it is thought of as the only substance, as one thinks of one People, one Horse, or one Soul speaks, or whether it is thought of as the only quality - white, was or something like that. All of this makes a significant difference, but none of the above is conceivable. For if the whole of being is both substance, quality and quantity, then there is a multiplicity of beings, whether one thinks the three determinations are separated from one another or connected with one another. But if the whole of being is merely quality or quantity, without it being important whether there is a substance or not, then the nonsense is perfect if the impossible has to be called nonsense otherwise. Because being for itself possesses only substance; everything else can only be thought of as a (determining) predicate of the substance as of the subject (in the judgment).
Μέλισσος δὲ τὸ ὂν ἄπειρον εἶναί φησιν. ποσὸν ἄρα τι τὸ ὄν · τὸ γὰρ ἄπειρον ἐν τῷ ποσῷ, οὐσίαν δὲ ἄπειρον εἶναι ἢ ποιότητα ἢ πάθος (185b) οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, εἰ ἅμα καὶ ποσὰ ἄττα εἶεν · ὁ γὰρ τοῦ ἀπείρου λόγος τῷ ποσῷ προσχρῆται, ἀλλ 'οὐκ οὐσίᾳ οὐδὲ τῷ ποιῷ. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν καὶ οὐσία ἔστι καὶ ποσόν, δύο καὶ οὐχ ἓν τὸ ὄν · εἰ δ 'οὐσία μόνον, οὐκ ἄπειρον, οὐδὲ μέγεθος ἕξει οὐδέν · ποσὸν γάρ τι ἔσται.Melissus now asserts the infinity of beings. Consequently, what is (after him) is a quantity. Because infinity is only possible as a determinateness of a quantity. A substance, on the other hand, a quality or a state (185b) can at most possess infinity in a mediated way, namely if at the same time they also have size determination in themselves. For the definition of the infinite demands the concept of quantity as the moment of definition, but not the concepts of substance or quality. If the being (according to Melissos, since he defines it as infinite) is both substance and quantity, then it is two beings, not one. However, if it is only substance, then it is not infinite and has no size whatsoever. Otherwise it has to be quantified.
ἔτι ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν πολλαχῶς λέγεται ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄν, σκεπτέον τίνα τρόπον λέγουσιν εἶναι ἓᾶν τν ενναι ᾶᾶν πντ. λέγεται δ 'ἓν ἢ τὸ συνεχὲς ἢ τὸ ἀδιαίρετον ἢ ὧν ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ εἷς ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶθναι, ὥσἶπερας. εἰ μὲν τοίνυν συνεχές, πολλὰ τὸ ἕν · εἰς ἄπειρον γὰρ διαιρετὸν τὸ συνεχές. (Ἔχει δ 'ἀπορίαν περὶ τοῦ μέρους καὶ τοῦ ὅλου, ἴσως δὲ οὐ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀλλ' αὐτὴν καθ 'αὑτήν, πότερον ἓν ἢ πλείω τὸ μέρος καὶ τὸ ὅλον, καὶ πῶς ἓν ἢ πλείω, καὶ εἰ πλείω, πῶς πλείω, καὶ περὶ τῶν μερῶν τῶν μὴ συνεχῶν · καὶ εἰ τῷ ὅλῳ ἓν ἑκάτερον ὡς ἀδιαίρετον, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς.) ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ ὡς ἀδιαίρετον, οὐθὲν ἔσται ποσὸν οὐδὲ ποιόν, οὐδὲ δὴ ἄπειρον τὸ ὄν, ὥσπερ Μέλισσός φησιν, οὐδὲ πεπερασμένον, ὥσπερ Παρμενίδης · τὸ γὰρ πέρας ἀδιαίρετον, οὐ τὸ πεπερασμένον.But since the term "the one" itself is ambiguous just like the term "the being speech", one must continue to ask the question of the way in which it is in the sentence, the whole of being one, is needed. There are three different meanings of the term: the unity of continuity, then the unity of indivisibility, and finally the unity and identity of the concept of essence, as is the case with the two words "grape juice" and "wine". If one takes (a) the unity of continuity as the basis for a possibility of meaning, it follows that its unity has manifold instead of unity. Because a continuum is infinitely divisible. - Incidentally, the relationship between part and whole contains a darkness that may not play a role in the present context, but is very important in it, which tells me whether part and whole represent a unity or a diversity, and how then their unity or else its manifold is to be thought of. and in particular how, if there should be a manifold, this manifold is to be thought; there is a further obscurity with regard to the concept of those parts which are parts of non-continuous wholes; and finally this too is full of obscurities that if each of the two parts of a whole represents a unity in the sense of being inseparable from one another, these two parts must also be one with each other. - If, on the other hand, the second meaning, i.e. the unity of indivisibility, is based on (b), then neither a size determination nor a qualitative determination (of the whole of being) is conceivable, and beings can neither, as Melissos wants, be infinite nor, like Parmenides thinks to be limited; for only the limit is indivisible, but not the limited structure. -
ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τῷ λόγῳ ἓν τὰ ὄντα πάντα ὡς λώπιον καὶ ἱμάτιον, τὸν Ἡρακλείτου λόγον συμβαίνει λέγειν αὐτοῖς · ταὐτὸν γὰρ ἔσται ἀγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ εἶναι, καὶ ἀγαθῷ καὶ μὴ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι - ὥστε ταὐτὸν ἔσται ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἵππος, καὶ οὐ περὶ τοῦ ἓν εἶναι τὰ ὄντα ὁ λόγος ἔσται ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ μηδέν - καὶ τὸ τοιῳδὶ εἶναι καὶ τοσῳδὶ τ. ἐθορυβοῦντο δὲ καὶ οἱ ὕστεροι τῶν ἀρχαίων ὅπως μὴ ἅμα γένηται αὐτοῖς τὸ αὐτὸ ἓν καὶ πολλά. διὸ οἱ μὲν τὸ ἐστὶν ἀφεῖλον, ὥσπερ Λυκόφρων, οἱ δὲ τὴν λέξιν μετερρύθμιζον, ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐ λευκός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ λελεύκωται, οὐδὲ βαδίζων ἐστὶν ἀλλὰ βαδίζει, ἵνα μή ποτε τὸ ἐστὶ προσάπτοντες πολλὰ εἶναι ποιῶσι τὸ ἕν, ὡς μοναχῶς λεγομένου τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ τοῦ ὄντος. πολλὰ δὲ τὰ ὄντα ἢ λόγῳ (οἷον ἄλλο τὸ λευκῷ εἶναι καὶ μουσικῷ, τὸ δ 'αὐτὸ ἄμφω · πολλὰ ἄδλι ὰετα στκ ὶιν. ἐνταῦθα (186a) δὲ ἤδη ἠπόρουν, καὶ ὡμολόγουν τὸ ἓν πολλὰ εἶναι - ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐνδεχόμενον ταὐτὸν ἕν τε καὶ πολλὰ εἶναι, μὴ τἀντικείμενα δέ · ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἓν καὶ δυνάμει καὶ ἐντελεχείᾳ. And if (c) the third meaning, the unity of the term, is based, if the whole of being is supposed to be one in the sense of a cape and cloak, then Melissus and Parmenides walk the path of Herakleitos: for then there is goodness and badness , Being good and not good are identical with each other - with the result that there is an identity between good and not good and man and horse and that the theorem no longer deals with the unity of beings, but becomes the assertion that beings are nothing at all - and then qualitative and quantitative determinateness are also identical with one another. - So the younger among the fathers of philosophy already make it their main concern, but to exclude a coincidence of unity and diversity in one and the same object. For this purpose, some, such as Lycophron, removed the copula from the sentence and the others tried to change the linguistic form (of the judgment) so that it should not say: man is white, or: he is walking around, but rather be called must: the person received the white color, or: he walks around. This distance and this bypassing of the copula should save the One from being many; but the whole proposal was based on the (wrong) opinion that the terms "the one" and "the being" were unambiguous. But the being is a manifold, namely (a conceptual or also a dividing manifold;) a concept manifold: for something else is, for example, whiteness and something else is being formed, and yet the one identical object is very well both together: so it is One at the same time a manifold; a manifold of division: an object is the whole that it is, and yet it is also the manifold of its parts. And with this latter point (186a) they no longer knew how to help and admitted the possibility that the one was a manifold - as if it were not absolutely fundamentally the possibility that one and the same possessed both unity and manifold, with the exception of merely one Multiplicity of contradicting determinations. There is unity in two ways: potential unity and actual unity.
Τόν τε δὴ τρόπον τοῦτον ἐπιοῦσιν ἀδύνατον φαίνεται τὰ ὄντα ἓν εἶναι, καὶ ἐξ ὧν ἐπλὐεικνύουσι, πλὐειννουσι, πλὐειννουσι, πλὐεχανονιννονεννοενανοεννενοενεν ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἐριστικῶς συλλογίζονται, καὶ Μέλισσος καὶ Παρμενίδης [καὶ γὰρ ψευδῆ λαμβάνουσι καὶ ἀσυλλόγιστοί εἰσιν αὐτῶν οἱ λόγοι · μᾶλλον δ 'ὁ Μελίσσου φορτικὸς καὶ οὐκ ἔχων ἀπορίαν, ἀλλ' ἑνὸς ἀτόπου δοθέντος τἆλλα συμβαίνει · τοῦτο δ 'οὐθὲν χαλεπόν]. ὅτι μὲν οὖν παραλογίζεται Μέλισσος, δῆλον οἴεται γὰρ εἰληφέναι, εἰ τὸ γενόμενον ἔχει ἀρχὴν ἅπὸόν, ὅρχὴν πὸόν, ὅντεντιαν, ὅνταντον ἔχει ἀρχὴν ἅπὸόν, ὅντεντεομ ἅει ἀρχὴν ἅπὸόν, ὅντεντεομ ἔχεγ ἔχρὸν ὐπὸόν, ὅνταντεομ εγ. εἶτα καὶ τοῦτο ἄτοπον, τὸ παντὸς εἶναι ἀρχήν τοῦ πράγματος καὶ μὴ τοῦ χρόνου, καὶ γενέσεως μὴ τῆς ἁπλῆς ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀλλοιώσεως, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἀθρόας γιγνομένης μεταβολῆς. ἔπειτα διὰ τί ἀκίνητον, εἰ ἕν; ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὸ μέρος ἓν ὄν, τοδὶ τὸ ὕδωρ, κινεῖται ἐν ἑαυτῷ, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ τὸ πᾶν; ἔπειτα ἀλλοίωσις διὰ τί οὐκ ἂν εἴη; ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ εἴδει οἷόν τε ἓν εἶναι, πλὴν τῷ ἐξ οὗ (οὕτως δὲ ἓν καὶ τῶν φυσικῶν τινες λέγουσιν, ἐκείνως δ 'οὔ) · ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἵππου ἕτερον τῷ εἴδει καὶ τἀναντία ἀλλήλων.3. If one approaches (the theses of Melissus and Parmenides) in the manner just described, it becomes apparent that there is an impossibility of a (manifold) unity of beings and the lack of stability of the presuppositions from which (this unity of beings) is derived. Both Melissos and Parmenides work namely with eristic false inferences [namely, what they set as premisses is wrong, and their deductions violate the logic of inference; The position of Melissos is particularly clumsy, it does not present any difficulty; rather, the wrong approach results in further developments by itself; it doesn't need any art]. The paralogism committed by Melissos is obvious. He considers this to be a valid approach: if every product of a becoming has a beginning, then that which is not a product of a becoming has no beginning. The opinion that everything must have a beginning is also untenable - this does not mean a beginning in terms of time, but rather the point at which the respective thing has its (spatial) beginning, and not just one (Spatial) starting point for the real emergence, but also at a (spatial) starting point for the qualitative change - as if there were no instant processes (in which an overall structure at the same time passes into its new state in all its parts). Furthermore: why should unity lead to immobility? Just as there is the possibility of movement for the part, which also represents a unit, for example for a certain subset of water, namely movement in itself, such (movement in itself) is also conceivable for the whole . And also: Why the exclusion of a possibility of qualitative change? And finally it is also impossible that beings are one in kind; at most one unity of all beings is possible with regard to the basic material of which it consists - this latter unity has actually found representatives among the natural philosophers, but not that (unity of beings according to their nature). Man and horse, as well as the limbs of all opposites, are of different species from one another.
καὶ πρὸς Παρμενίδην δὲ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος τῶν λόγων, καὶ εἴ τινες ἄλλοι εἰσὶν ἴδιοι · καὶ ἡ λύσις τῇ μὲν ὅτι ψευδὴς τῇ δὲ ὅτι οὐ συμπεραίνεται, ψευδὴς μὲν ᾗ ἁπλῶς λαμβάνει τὸ ὂν λέγεσθαι, λεγομένου πολλαχῶς, ἀσυμπέραντος δὲ ὅτι, εἰ μόνα τὰ λευκὰ ληφθείη, σημαίνοντος ἓν τοῦ λευκοῦ, οὐθὲν ἧττον πολλὰ τὰ λευκὰ καὶ οὐχ ἕν · οὔτε γὰρ τῇ συνεχείᾳ ἓν ἔσται τὸ λευκὸν οὔτε τῷ λόγῳ. ἄλλο γὰρ ἔσται τὸ εἶναι λευκῷ καὶ τῷ δεδεγμένῳ. καὶ οὐκ ἔσται παρὰ τὸ λευκὸν οὐθὲν χωριστόν · οὐ γὰρ ᾗ χωριστὸν ἀλλὰ τῷ εἶναι ἕτερον τὸ λευκᾧν ιρν τὸ λευκὸν ιρν χρτν ωριστόν. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο Παρμενίδης οὔπω συνεώρα. ἀνάγκη δὴ λαβεῖν μὴ μόνον ἓν σημαίνειν τὸ ὄν, καθ 'οὗ ἂν κατηγορηθῇ, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπερ ὂν καὶ ὅπερ ἕν. τὸ γὰρ συμβεβηκὸς καθ 'ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται, ὥστε ᾧ συμβέβηκε τὸ ὄν, οὐκ ἔσταἄς (ἕτερο ν) στὐρα (ἕτεροὄb) στὐρα (ἕτερο ν) στὐρα (ἕτεροὄ ν) στὰρα (ἕτερὄ ν) σταρα (ἕτερὄὄ ν) στὐρα (ἕτεροὄ ν) στὐρα (ἕτεροὄ ν). οὐ δὴ ἔσται ἄλλῳ ὑπάρχον τὸ ὅπερ ὄν. οὐ γὰρ ἔσται ὄν τι αὐτὸ εἶναι, εἰ μὴ πολλὰ τὸ ὂν σημαίνει οὕτως ὥστε εἶναί τι ἕκαστον. ἀλλ 'ὑπόκειται τὸ ὂν σημαίνειν ἕν. εἰ οὖν τὸ ὅπερ ὂν μηδενὶ συμβέβηκεν ἀλλὰ <τὰ ἄλλα> ἐκείνῳ, τί μᾶλλον τὸ ὅπερ ὂν σημαίνεν τὸ ὂν ἢ μὄ εἰ γὰρ ἔσται τὸ ὅπερ ὂν [ταὐτὸ] καὶ λευκόν, τὸ λευκῷ δ 'εἶναι μὴ ἔστιν ὅπερ ὄν (οὐδὲ γὰρ συμβεβηκέναι αὐτῷ οἷόν τε τὸ ὄν · οὐδὲν γὰρ ὂν ὃ οὐχ ὅπερ ὄν) οὐκ ἄρα ὂν τὸ λευκόν · οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὥσπερ τι μὴ ὄν, ἀλλ 'ὅλως μὴ ὄν. τὸ ἄρα ὅπερ ὂν οὐκ ὄν ἀληθὲς γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὅτι λευκόν, τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ὂν ἐσήμαινεν. ὥστε καὶ τὸ λευκὸν σημαίνει ὅπερ ὄν πλείω ἄρα σημαίνει τὸ ὄν. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ μέγεθος ἕξει τὸ ὄν, εἴπερ ὅπερ ὂν τὸ ὄν ἑκατέρῳ γὰρ ἕτερον τὸ εἶναι τῶν μορίων.

The same applies to Parmenides, although there are, of course, a few things that are peculiar only to him. And the refutation consists on the one hand in the proof of the falseness (of his approach), on the other hand in the proof that his derivation goes wrong. But Parmenides did not yet understand that. So the approach inevitably became (for him) that the predicate "being" with reference to every possible object of assessment does not only mean unity, but essential determination of being and essential unity. Because the additional Determination is predicated of a certain (different from) object and the consequence here would be that this object, for which the determinateness of being would only be an additional determination, would not be itself at all - because it would be different from the determinateness of "being" -. (186b) There would then be a nonexistent (and it would just be said of it that it is!). And so only this remains (for Parmenides): the essential determinateness of being (exists for itself; it) is not determinateness in something different from it. For it could only be a single, definite being on the condition that the term "being" stands for a manifold, and in such a way that every member can have the same determinateness. But (this is not possible for Parmenides; because) there stands the basic thesis against it: The terminud "being" means only one thing. - But now: if this essential determinateness of being cannot be additional determinateness in something else, but can only add additional determinations to it, how should this term "essential determinateness of being" denote precisely what is and not just as well mean non-existent? For if this essential determinateness of being is supposed to be white at the same time, but whiteness cannot be identical with this essential determinateness of being - for it cannot be its determinateness, where only the essential determinateness of being is supposed to have the character of a being - then the result is (the nonsense): What is white is not a being at all. And not just no being of a certain kind, but in no sense a being. But that means (nothing less than this): This essential determinateness of being is itself not a being at all. Because that cannot be shaken White is; but the definition "knows" (this is part of what has been agreed for Parmenides) designates its object as something that does not exist. But that means (that one now has to say the other way around): also the determinateness "knows" must be essential determinateness of being. And that means in turn: The term "being" denotes one Manifold. - Incidentally, consequently also beings, if they are already (according to Parmenides) the determinateness of being existing for themselves, cannot have any extent of size; because (if it has expansion, it has parts; if it has parts, it is not one: for) each part would have its own being for itself.

ὅτι δὲ διαιρεῖται τὸ ὅπερ ὂν εἰς ὅπερ ὄν τι ἄλλο, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ φανερόν, οἷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰ ἔστιν ὅπερ ὄν τι, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ζῷον ὅπερ ὄν τι εἶναι καὶ τὸ δίπουν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ὅπερ ὄν τι, συμβεβηκότα ἔσται. ἢ οὖν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἢ ἄλλῳ τινὶ ὑποκειμένῳ. ἀλλ 'ἀδύνατον · συμβεβηκός τε γὰρ λέγεται τοῦτο, ἢ ὃ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ἢ οὗ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὑπάρχει τὸ ᾧ συμβέβηκεν [ἢ ἐν ᾧ ὁ λόγος ὑπάρχει ᾧ συμβέβηκεν] (οἷον τὸ μὲν καθῆσθαι ὡς χωριζόμενον, ἐν δὲ τῷ σιμῷ ὑπάρχει ὁ λόγος ὁ τῆς ῥινὸς ᾗ φαμὲν συμβεβηκέναι τὸ σιμόν) ·That the essential determinateness of being is a Manifold must be, which separates into particular further determinations of being, also teaches us without a doubt (the logic) of the concept; If, for example, the concept of man is the concept of a determinate essence, then the concepts of living being and bipedal are necessarily also concepts of determinate essence; for otherwise the concepts would have to be merely additional determinations. And then either those of the person or of another object. But both turn out to be impossible. (Proof of the impossibility of the first Alternative member:) Additional determinateness is called a determinateness if it either does not necessarily belong to the object, or if in its definition the object to which it belongs appears [or if in it the concept of the object to which it belongs is contained], - for example, "sitting" is such an unnecessary determinacy and the concept of the eye to which we attribute the squint is involved in the concept of squinting.
ἔτι ὅσα ἐν τῷ ὁριστικῷ λόγῳ ἔνεστιν ἢ ἐξ ὧν ἐστιν, ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ τούτων οὐκ ἐνυπάρχει ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ ὅλου, οἷον ἐν τῷ δίποδι ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἐν τῷ λευκῷ ὁ τοῦ λευκοῦ ἀνθρώπου. εἰ τοίνυν ταῦτα τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ συμβέβηκε τὸ δίπουν, ἀνάγκη χωριστὸν εἶναι αὐτό, ὥστε ἐνδέχοιτο ἂν μὴ δίπουν εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἢ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ τοῦ δίποδος ἐνέσται ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγος. ἀλλ 'ἀδύνατον ἐκεῖνο γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἐκείνου λόγῳ ἔνεστιν. εἰ δ 'ἄλλῳ συμβέβηκε τὸ δίπουν καὶ τὸ ζῷον, καὶ μὴ ἔστιν ἑκάτερον ὅπερ ὄν τι, καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἂβτῳβτητω τω εβητω ἂβτῶβτητωτω ββτῳβτητω ητω ἂητω σητω ἂητω σητω ἂητω ἂητω σητω σητω βητω στω σητω βητω στω ἂητω ἂητω βητω ἂητω στω ἂητω ἂητω στω ἂβτ εἴητω ἂβτ εἴητω ἂβτν καὶ τὸ ζῷουν καὶ τὸ ζῷον ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅπερ ὂν ἔστω μηδενὶ συμβεβηκός, καὶ καθ 'οὗ ἄμφω [καὶ ἑκατέρον], καὶ τὸ ἐρκ ταύτων λὸε ρέθω ντὸετᾶθω · ρἄτω ντε ωρστω ντε έρτθωFurthermore: The definition pieces contain in her Concept not the concept of the whole (which they are supposed to define); thus the concept of the biped does not contain the concept of man, the concept of pale does not contain the concept of pale man. If, in such a fundamental situation, bipedalism should (nevertheless) be merely an additional definiteness in man, then it would have to be an unnecessary definiteness in him, so man should also be possible without bipedal - or in the concept of bipedal the concept of man would have to be (as a definition piece). Both are impossible. Because the former concept is part of the definition of the latter. - (Proof of the impossibility of the second Member :) If the two determinations "bipedal" and "living beings" are to be additional determinations on another carrier, so neither of them enjoy the position of an essential determinism, then the concept of the human being would only be the concept of such, that only as additional Certainty can occur in another. But the essential determinateness (according to its concept) should not be able to be assigned to a single object as a mere additional determinateness and the object for which the two members [and also each of them] function as a piece of definition should also experience its definition through their complexation. - Should (one now have to think that) the whole of being is built up from indivisible units?
(187a) ἔνιοι δ 'ἐνέδοσαν τοῖς λόγοις ἀμφοτέροις, τῷ μὲν ὅτι πάντα ἕν, εἰ τὸ ὂν ἓν σημαίνει, ὅτι ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὄν, τῷ δὲ ἐκ τῆς διχοτομίας, ἄτομα ποιήσαντες μεγέθη. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθὲς ὡς, εἰ ἓν σημαίνει τὸ ὂν καὶ μὴ οἷόν τε ἅμα τὴν ἀντίφασιν, οὐκ ἔσται οὐθὲν μὴ ὄν · οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει, μὴ ἁπλῶς εἶναι, ἀλλὰ μὴ ὄν τι εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν. τὸ δὲ δὴ φάναι, παρ 'αὐτὸ τὸ ὂν εἰ μή τι ἔσται ἄλλο, ἓν πάντα ἔσεσθαι, ἄτοπον. τίς γὰρ μανθάνει αὐτὸ τὸ ὂν εἰ μὴ τὸ ὅπερ ὄν τι εἶναι; εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲν ὅμως κωλύει πολλὰ εἶναι τὰ ὄντα, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἓν εἶναι τὸ ὂν ἀδύνατον, δῆλον.(187a) Some have capitulated to the two arguments (of the Eleates); Against the one argument that everything must be one if the term "seined" was unambiguous, they admitted that there is nonexistent; They also gave in to the argumentation from the dichotomy and allowed indivisible quantities. . But also the protection, if the term "being" is unambiguous and should not at the same time also mean the contradictory opposite (of itself), then every non-existing is excluded, is obviously wrong. Because even if it is excluded that the nonexistent absolutely is not so there is still no obstacle to it in a certain way is a nonexistent. And so the further assertion, if there is not something else besides the "being itself", then everything must be one (namely this one and only being), absurd. Because who should be among this "being itself" other than one certain To be able to think determinate essence? But then there is no obstacle after all to the fact that being, as has been explained, is a manifold. - That being is one in this way (assumed by the elites) is now unequivocally ruled out.
 Translated by: H. Wagner, Berlin (Akademie-Verlag) 1967
Sententiae excerptae:
Greek to "Aristot"
the change of everything delighted (varietas (variatio) delectat, Phaedr.2, pr.10)


Literature:
to "Aristot" and "Parmenid"
Outline of Greek Philosophy
Franfurt (Main), Hirschgraben, 3/1969

Basic problems in the history of ancient science, pp.221-250
Berlin, New York (de Gruyter) 1971.


Site Search:
- /Grie/aristot/aristphys184a.php - Last update: 29.12.2020 - 10:42